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Summary
Even when confined to the same spatial location, flick-
ering and steady light evoke very different conscious
experiences because of their distinct temporal pat-
terns. The neural basis of such differences in subjec-
tive experience remains uncertain [1]. Here, we used
functional MRI in humans to examine the neural struc-
tures involved in awareness of flicker. Participants
viewed a single point source of light that flickered at
the critical flicker fusion (CFF) threshold, where the
same stimulus is sometimes perceived as flickering
and sometimes as steady (fused) [1–3]. We were thus
able to compare brain activity for conscious percepts
that differed qualitatively (flickering or fused) but
were evoked by identical physical stimuli. Greater
brain activationwasobserved on flicker (versus fused)
trials in regions of frontal and parietal cortex previ-
ously associated with visual awareness in tasks that
did not require detection of temporal patterns [4–14].
In contrast, greater activation was observed on fused
(versus flicker) trials in occipital extrastriate cortex.
Our findings indicate that activity of higher-level corti-
cal areas is important for awareness of temporally dis-
tinct visual events in the context of a nonspatial task,
and they thus suggest that frontal and parietal regions
may play a general role in visual awareness.
Results
Subjective experience of the physical world depends
not only on the spatial arrangement of the environment,
but also on the temporal pattern of stimulation. For
example, flickering and steady light can be presented
in the same location yet evoke a very different conscious
experience because of their different temporal patterns.
The neural correlates of such temporally dependent
aspects of conscious experience remain largely un-
known. Recent studies show that visual awareness is
*Correspondence: d.carmel@ucl.ac.ukassociated not only with activity in occipital visual cor-
tex but also in areas of frontal and parietal cortex
[4–14]; and transient [15, 16] or permanent [17, 18] dis-
ruption of parietal- and frontal-cortex activity can lead
to deficits in spatial awareness. The common involve-
ment of these regions in diverse experimental para-
digms suggests that they play a general role in visual
awareness, and many studies have indeed suggested
that attentional functions mediated by these regions
are critical for awareness. However, it is not known
whether activity in these areas is also associated with
temporal aspects of subjective experience.
We therefore used event-related functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans to determine the
neural correlates of conscious perception of flicker.
Flicker is a rapid train of discrete luminance changes.
When sufficiently fast, such luminance changes are no
longer perceived as flickering but as steady, or fused,
illumination [2, 3]. At the critical flicker fusion (CFF)
threshold (w25–50 Hz [1–3]), a flickering light has an
equal probability of being perceived as flickering or
fused. Previous neuroimaging research on flicker has
focused on the relationship between different flicker
frequencies and brain activity [19–23]. In contrast, here
we avoided confounding physical stimulation and per-
ceptual outcome by characterizing brain activity associ-
ated with different conscious percepts (flickering or
fused), but evoked by physically identical stimuli (flicker
at the CFF threshold). Because neurons in early visual
cortex can reflect frequencies far above the CFF thresh-
old [24–29], we reasoned that perception of flicker at
threshold frequencies would depend instead on activity
in higher cortical regions. Specifically, fluctuations of
attention-related activity in these higher-level regions
might determine whether the same stimulus will lead
to a flicker or fused percept. We therefore hypothesized
that the frontal and parietal regions previously impli-
cated in nontemporal aspects of awareness [4, 5] would
also be involved in conscious awareness of flicker (see
the Supplemental Data available online for specific pre-
dicted anatomic loci). We measured brain activity in 13
participants who responded on each trial to a single,
foveated Light Emitting Diode (LED) flickering for
500 ms at one of three frequencies (the individually ad-
justed CFF threshold and threshold 6 1 Hz; see Experi-
mental Procedures) by reporting whether or not they
perceived the light to be flickering. Catch trials (with
frequencies either much higher or lower than the CFF
threshold) were used to control for response bias.
Behavior
Mean flicker-fusion threshold was 29.85 Hz across
participants (range 24–35 Hz), and flicker percepts
were reported on 41% of trials (range 29%–66%), so
there were large numbers of both flicker and fused per-
cepts for all participants. Performance on catch trials
was nearly perfect, with 0.43 miscategorizations (range
0–3) for the 12 catch trials in each fMRI run. Participants
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sponding randomly.
fMRI
A within-subject random-effects ANOVA was used to re-
veal brain areas associated with effects of percept
(flicker or fused), frequency, and their interaction. In vox-
els where there was a significant effect of percept, t tests
were used to determine its direction. Physically identical
trials evoking flicker (versus fused) percepts were asso-
ciated with greater activation in predicted parietal and
frontal regions (Figure 1 and Table 1), e.g., intraparietal
sulcus (Brodmann area 7 [BA7]); the inferior parietal lob-
ule (BA40); the inferior (BA44), middle (BA46), and medial
(BA6) frontal gyri; the anterior insula; and the cingulate
sulcus (BA32). Activation was bilateral in frontal regions,
but lateralized to the left in the parietal lobe. In contrast,
fused percepts were associated with activation in sev-
eral brain regions (Table 2 and Figure 2), especially oc-
cipital extrastriate cortex. Activation was bilateral, but
the most significant activations were observed in the
right hemisphere. No brain areas showed a significant
main effect of frequency or an interaction between fre-
quency and percept. This rules out the possibility that
Figure 1. Flicker > Fused
A number of the frontal and parietal areas where event-related activ-
ity was greater for flicker than for fused percepts are superimposed
on sagittal and coronal sections of a T1-weighted anatomical tem-
plate image in MNI space. All peaks of activation reaching statistical
significance are listed in Table 1. A statistical threshold of Z = 2.58
(corresponding to p < 0.005, uncorrected) and a cluster-size thresh-
old of at least 10 voxels were used for display purposes in this and
Figure 2. The MNI coordinate corresponding to the section’s plane
is indicated on each section. IPS denotes intraparietal sulcus,
MFG denotes middle frontal gyrus, and Ins denotes insula.differential brain activity associated with flicker (versus
fused) percepts could be due to the different frequen-
cies used (see Experimental Procedures and Figure S1).
Eye Monitoring
Eye-monitoring data were available for eight of the 13
participants and showed no significant differences be-
tween flicker and fused percepts for either mean dis-
tance from fixation (t(7) = 0.832, ns) or the standard devi-
ation of distances (t(7) = 1.224, ns). This rules out any
effect of saccades or variance in eye position on our
findings, but it remains possible that microsaccades or
other fixational eye movements could contribute to our
findings (see Supplemental Data for details). In contrast
to the distance measures, pupil diameter was sig-
nificantly greater on flicker (versus fused) trials (t(7) =
4.217, p = 0.004). However, this effect was extremely
small (a difference ofw0.05 mm, representing a change
ofw2% in pupil area) and thus unlikely to result in differ-
ential activation in visual cortex. Indeed, activation in ex-
trastriate cortex was lower, not higher, on trials in which
flicker was perceived despite pupil diameter being
slightly larger (Table 2). Importantly, the difference in pu-
pil diameter was apparent from trial onset and remained
similar in magnitude throughout the trial (as indicated by
the first pupil-diameter measurement in a trial: t(7) =
4.667, p = 0.002; and also by dividing the trial into 100
ms bins: flicker > fused in all bins, main effect of flicker
versus fused F(1,7) = 18.28, p = 0.004; all t(7) scores for
the separate bins > 4.166, p = 0.004; no interaction be-
tween bin and percept, F(1,7) < 1).
Discussion
Flickering and fused percepts were associated with dis-
tinct patterns of activation in response to physically
identical flickering stimuli. Specifically, perception of
flicker was associated with greater activation in bilateral
frontal and left parietal cortex. This cortical network
has previously been associated with awareness in
tasks that did not specifically examine the temporal as-
pects of subjective experience in a nonspatial task, as
studied here [4–18]. Our new findings demonstrate that
these areas are also involved in awareness of temporalTable 1. Loci and t Scores of Cluster Maxima in which There Was Significantly Higher Activation for Flicker Than for Fused Percepts
Region Brodmann Area Hemisphere x y z t Score
Inferior parietal lobule 40 L 257 230 39 4.42
Inferior frontal gyrus 44 L 260 9 21 4.11
Intraparietal sulcus 7 L 239 242 48 3.94
Middle frontal gyrus 46 L 245 45 18 3.80
Middle frontal gyrus 46 R 48 48 9 3.57
Anterior insula — R 30 24 0 3.75
Anterior insula — L 239 18 23 3.61
Cingulate sulcus 32 L 26 30 30 3.75
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L 212 26 57 3.59
Parieto-occipital fisure 7 L 212 275 45 3.55
Superior frontal gyrus 6 R 21 218 66 3.48
Coordinates are given in standard MNI space. Shown are significantly activated voxels in frontal and parietal cortex, at a threshold of p < 0.001,
uncorrected (because of our prior hypothesis regarding these areas, see Supplemental Data). Even at this uncorrected threshold, there were only
two foci of activation outside the predicted regions: in the medial aspect of the superior frontal gyrus (BA8), and in the postcentral gyrus (BA2).
Only one of the predicted regions (BA9) contained no activated foci. R denotes right hemisphere; L denotes left hemisphere.
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Region Brodmann Area Hemisphere x y z t Score
Middle occipital gyrus 18/19 R 33 290 15 5.52
Cuneus 18/19 R 9 293 18 5.19
Cuneus 19 R 12 287 36 4.33
Lateral occipital sulcus 18/19 R 42 275 3 4.96
Fusiform gyrus 37 L 236 242 215 4.83
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 R 54 30 12 4.61
Middle temporal gyrus 21 L 257 233 0 4.56
Middle temporal gyrus 21 L 266 227 23 4.04
Cerebellum, posterior lobe — L 224 266 221 4.56
Anterior occipital sulcus 18/19 L 230 275 26 4.46
Postcentral gyrus 1 L 239 221 42 4.32
Insula — L 230 6 18 4.24
Posterior transverse
collateral sulcus
18/19 L 221 272 26 4.46
Superior occipital gyrus 18/19 R 15 2102 6 4.15
Inferior occipital gyrus 18/19 R 30 287 215 4.14
Inferior occipital gyrus 18/19 R 18 299 26 4.10
Transverse occipital sulcus 18/19 R 30 281 18 4.07
Transverse occipital sulcus 18/19 R 30 284 9 4.04
Transverse occipital sulcus 18/19 R 39 275 21 3.98
Cerebellum (vermis) — 0 263 23 4.05
Coordinates are given in standard MNI space. Because we had no prior hypothesis regarding areas that would be activated when participants
failed to detect flicker, we used a corrected threshold of p < 0.05 (FDR correction) for this contrast, as well as for the main effect of frequency and
the interaction of frequency and percept, for which no significant activations were found (see fMRI section). R denotes right hemisphere; L de-
notes left hemisphere.nonspatial properties of the visual environment and may
therefore play a general role in visual awareness.
Patients with right parietal damage are impaired in
temporal discrimination (distinguishing onsets from off-
sets), but have no impairment in detecting flicker [30].
This is consistent with our finding of left parietal activa-
tion for flicker detection. Taken together, these findings
suggest that right parietal damage may be associated
with the disruption of an attentional process devoted
to relative timing [30] but not with the detection of tem-
poral patterns, which may be functionally preserved in
the intact left parietal lobe.
Neurons in visual cortex represent flicker at much
higher frequencies than the CFF threshold [24–29], con-
sistent with our finding that there was no interaction of
frequency and percept (see Figure S1, Supplemental
Data). Frontoparietal activity related to the percept of
flicker may thus be associated with processes linked
to awareness rather than sensory processing per se.
Figure 2. Fused > Flicker
Sagittal and coronal sections of a T1-weighted anatomical template
image in MNI space, with superimposed areas where event-related
activity was greater for fused than for flicker percepts. Most of this
activity occurred in occipital extrastriate regions. The full list of acti-
vation peaks reaching statistical significance is given in Table 2. The
following abbreviations are used: MO, middle occipital gyrus; FO,
fourth occipital gyrus; Fus, fusiform gyrus; and Cun, cuneus.Our findings are also consistent with theories of visual
awareness in which awareness is constrained not by
the properties of early visual neurons, but rather by a
higher-level network comprising neuronal ‘‘coalitions’’
or serving as a ‘‘global neuronal workspace.’’ In such
views, consciousness arises from the interaction of
widespread networks across the brain, rather than
from activity in early sensory cortex [31–34].
Given that we used a single point source of light, shifts
of spatial attention cannot account for these findings
(unlike many previous studies of visual awareness [4–
18]). However, our data also raise the intriguing and
rather different possibility that nonspatial attention,
known to be associated with frontoparietal activation
similar to that found here [35], is involved in conscious
flicker perception. Functional-imaging data cannot de-
termine whether frontoparietal activation plays a causal
role in flicker detection, or whether it results from such
detection. For example, perceived flicker may attract at-
tention automatically as a result of the sharp luminance
onsets, and frontoparietal activity may reflect this. Alter-
natively, flicker detection may be facilitated when activ-
ity levels in frontoparietal cortex are high, consistent
with a causal role for (nonspatial) attentional functions
of the frontoparietal cortex in flicker awareness. Inter-
estingly, the latter possibility is supported by our find-
ings that flicker percepts were associated with a slightly
larger pupil diameter from trial onset. Pupil dilation has
previously been associated with attention and effort
[36], and pupil dilation induced by task difficulty has
been associated with activity in frontal and parietal re-
gions [37]. We speculate that the difference in pupil
size we observed may therefore result from cortical ac-
tivity related to attentional effort in the flicker detection
task, reflecting a pre-existing brain state that may have
determined the perceptual outcome of each trial. Atten-
tional effort may have fluctuated between trials, with
Current Biology
910increases in attention leading both to better flicker
detection and to pupil dilation. Importantly, attention
would not be directed at spatial, but rather at temporal
properties of the stimulus. Such a notion receives sup-
port from recent behavioral work showing that temporal
parsing of visual input is sensitive to attentional manip-
ulation [38–40]. The frontoparietal activity we found may
reflect a general role of attention in enhancing the detec-
tion and selection of any target event (be it temporal or
spatial), but it is important to note that because partici-
pants reported their percept on both flicker and fused
trials, the ability to report the target cannot, in itself,
account for observations of frontoparietal activity asso-
ciated with flicker perception.
In contrast to conscious perception of flicker, fused
percepts were predominantly associated with activation
of occipital cortex. Foveal presentation of the flicker
stimulus, plus our random-effects analysis (which nec-
essarily averaged across participants), does not permit
determination of the precise retinotopic location of
these activations. However, they fall clearly outside the
calcarine sulcus and therefore are likely to reflect activ-
ity in extrastriate visual cortex [41]. The finding of acti-
vated extrastriate foci for physically identical (though
perceptually distinct) stimuli is surprising but clearly
rules out the possibility that successful flicker detection
relies on activity in early visual cortex (either instead of
or in addition to the frontoparietal activity). It is well es-
tablished that activity in visual cortex can more closely
reflect phenomenal experience than physical stimula-
tion [42, 43]. The present findings suggest that such dif-
ferences in activity of visual cortex may extend to situa-
tions where phenomenally different experience arises
from different temporal parsing of visual input.
Conclusions
Frontal and parietal cortex is involved in detecting flicker
in a single, small point source of light. Given that activity
in similar cortical regions has previously been associ-
ated with visual awareness in a variety of other tasks
that have not involved detection of a temporal pattern,
our findings suggest that frontal and parietal cortex
may play an important general role in supporting visual
awareness.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Thirteen healthy volunteers (11 female, mean age 26.4, range 23–34)
gave written informed consent to participate in the study, which was
approved by the local ethics committee. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
fMRI Scanning
A 3T Siemens Allegra system was used to acquire both T1-weighted
anatomical images and T2-weighted echoplanar (EPI) images
with blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast. For full
details, see Supplemental Data.
Stimuli and Apparatus
Participants lay supine in the MRI scanner. On each trial, they fixated
(through a mirror mounted on the head coil) a single red LED (CIE
chromaticity coordinates x = 0.655, y = 0.344) subtending 0.2º visual
angle, which flickered for 500 ms (square-wave flicker, 1:1 duty
cycle; luminance 29 cd/m2 at 30 Hz). Foveal presentation and brief
duration minimized temporal adaptation effects [2]. Four fluorescent
nonius lines (at right angles to each other in a ‘‘+’’ configuration) wereplaced around the LED to aid fixation. The room was completely
dark apart from the LED and nonius lines. On each trial, participants
reported by button press whether they perceived the light as flicker-
ing or not.
Behavioral-Threshold Measurement
To observe the neural correlates of the percept (flickering or fused)
while keeping the physical stimulus constant, we first assessed the
CFF threshold (the frequency at which a flickering light has an equal
probability of being perceived as flickering or fused) for each
participant. The CFF threshold was assessed at the beginning of
the experimental session, in the scanner (but prior to scanning), by
using the method of constant stimuli. For full details of the proce-
dure, see Supplemental Data. The data obtained were used to esti-
mate the participant’s threshold frequency (the frequency at which
the participant would be equally likely to categorize the stimulus
as flickering or fused). This was rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber and then used to determine the frequencies displayed during
scanning (see below).
MRI Scanning
In a preliminary behavioral study, we found that even when shown
the preassessed threshold frequency, if only a single frequency
was used in all trials, participants tended to adopt a constant re-
sponse. In order to eliminate this tendency, we used three frequen-
cies in our experimental conditions: the preassessed threshold
(rounded to the nearest whole number) and frequencies 1 Hz lower
and 1 Hz higher. Each flicker event lasted 500 ms. Null events, in
which no stimulus appeared, were also included. There were an
equal number of trials with threshold frequency, threshold minus 1
Hz, threshold plus 1 Hz, and null events. In addition, to further mon-
itor for any response bias, we included a small number of catch trials
in which the frequency was reliably above or below CFF threshold:
either 8 Hz higher (5% of trials) or 8 Hz lower (5% of trials). For further
details, see Supplemental Data.
Data Analysis
Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2, Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London) was
used to analyze the functional-imaging data. Standardized proce-
dures were employed for preprocessing (see Supplemental Data
for details). An event-related random-effects model was used for
statistical analysis.
Eye-Position Monitoring
During scanning, eye position was continually sampled at 60 Hz by
using long-range infrared video-oculography (ASL 504LRO Eye
Tracking System, Massachusetts). For further details, see Supple-
mental Data.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and one figure and are available with this article online at: http://
www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/16/9/907/DC1/.
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